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Action-monitoring and Intention Reporting in Children with Autism
James Russell and Elisabeth L. Hill
University of Cambridge, U.K.
The ‘‘mindblindness ’’ theory of core cognitive impairment in autism and at least one of the
executive theories of the core cognitive deficit both predict that children with autism should
find it difficult to report what their intention was when it diverged from an outcome. The
former predicts this because it takes intention reporting to require a ‘‘ theory of mind’’ and
the latter predicts it because the theory posits an impairment in the monitoring of goal-
directed actions. The latter also predicts impairments in the ability to monitor basic actions.
Our three studies failed to support either of these views. Experiment 1 demonstrated intact
abilities in the monitoring of basic actions (detecting which stimulus of a number of stimuli
one is controlling). Experiment 2 demonstrated intact abilities in reporting an intention, both
for self and for another agent, when the outcome was unintended but desired. In Experiment
3, using the novel ‘‘ transparent intentions task’’, we found (with a minor qualification) intact
ability in reporting on nonballistic intended actions when the result that the action achieved
was unexpected. The implications of these results for views of the relation between theory of
mind and executive difficulties in autism are discussed.
Keywords: Autism, cognition, executive functions, false belief task, intention, theory of
mind.
Abbreviations: AS: Asperger syndrome; BPVS: British Picture Vocabulary Scale ; CWA:
children with autism; MLD: moderate learning difficulties ; ToM: theory of mind; TROG:
Test for the Reception of Grammar; VIQ: Verbal IQ; VMA: verbal mental age.
Relatively little research has emerged to date into the
understanding of intention by children with autism. This
is surprising in view of the fact that at least two of the
cognitive theories of autism would seem to predict that
individuals with the disorder should find their own and
other’s intentions difficult to report. In the first place, the
hypothesis that the core cognitive disorder in autism is
one of ‘‘ theory of mind’’ (ToM; Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Leslie, 1987) can be taken to predict that intentions will
be hard to understand insofar as intention is no less of a
mental concept than is belief (on which see Perner &
Lang, 1999). In the second place, at least one version of
the hypothesis that the core cognitive impairment in
autism is executive in nature makes a similar prediction.
The claim here is that impaired action-monitoring
(ranging from the production of efference copies of
actions up to self-monitoring—see below) is what ac-
counts both for the multiplicity of executive deficits
found in autism and for the coexistence of executive and
mentalising deficits in the disorder (Russell, 1996, 1997a).
It needs to be stressed, however, that there are, in
addition, a number of executive-deficit theories that do
not make this prediction (Ozonoff, 1998; Pennington et
al., 1997; see chapters in Russell, 1997b).
In each of the three studies to be reported here we
presented children with autism, together with at least one
Requests for reprints to: James Russell, Department of Ex-
perimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, Downing
Street, Cambridge CB2 3EB, U.K.
(E-mail : jr111!cus.cam.ac.uk).
comparison group, with tasks designed to tap the ability
either (a) to monitor the outcome of intentional move-
ments, or (b) to discriminate between desired but ac-
cidental outcomes and intended outcomes, or (c) to
report on the nature of an intended action when the
outcome of the action achieved was unexpected. With
regard to (a), note that only the variety of executive-
deficit theory just described predicts that children with
autism will show a deficit. In (b) we attempted to replicate
(and extend) a study by Phillips, Baron-Cohen, and
Rutter (1998), which appeared to demonstrate that
children with autism tend to report that an accidental but
desired outcome had in fact been intended. Finally, in (c),
we present a novel task called the ‘‘ transparent intentions
task’’, in which a drawing completed by participants
turns out unexpectedly to have a different nature from
that intended.
Turning first to action-monitoring, this term refers to
the mechanisms that ensure that agents always know,
without self-observation, (1) for which changes in per-
ceptual input they are responsible and (2) what they are
currently engaged in doing. With regard to (1), Russell
(1996) has discussed how the development of self-world
dualism is likely to be grounded in the ability to
distinguish between self-caused and world-caused
changes in phenomenology (Russell, 1996, in press).
Using somewhat similar assumptions Povinelli and Cant
(1995) have argued that the evolution of ‘‘self-concep-
tion’’ in the great apes was a partial consequence of the
degree of action-monitoring required to negotiate the
transit of their large and heavy bodies through a fragile,
arboreal habitat. With reference to autism, Russell
(1997a) has also proposed that such monitoring processes
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may break down when the disorder develops early in the
second year of life. This breakdown—the argument
runs—could impact upon the acquisition of theory of
mind insofar as this acquisition depends upon possessing
a form of ‘‘pre-theoretical self-awareness ’’ that self-
monitoring (along with other capacities) makes possible.
The second and ‘‘higher ’’ level of action-monitoring
(2) refers to the ability to monitor one’s goal-directed
actions rather than one’s simple movements. This is
referred to by Feinberg (1978) and by C. D. Frith (1992)
as ‘‘self-monitoring’’. The monitoring of thoughts
(understood as mental actions) is subsumed under their
use of the term ‘‘self-monitoring’’. To explain, when we
launch an action or a thought we are never surprised to
find ourselves doing X or thinking Y. This—it could be
argued—is due to the fact that, like simple motor acts,
intentions and thoughts also receive a form of efference
copying. Both Feinberg and Frith use this assumption as
the cornerstone of their accounts of schizophrenic symp-
toms such as delusions of alien control and auditory
hallucinations. In a nutshell, their claim is that, unlike
ourselves, individuals with schizophrenia are ‘‘ surprised’’
to find themselves doing X and thinking Y and that they
accordingly construct accounts in terms of external
agencies to render their own actions and experiences
intelligible. If this higher form of action-monitoring
breaks down early in life, before a full-blown conception
of mentality has developed, children would lack a secure
experience of their own actions and thoughts as being
their own, which would inevitably impact upon their
ability to exercise theories of mental life. At the same
time, one would, of course, expect there to be difficulty
with formal tests of executive functioning such as the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task and ‘‘ tower’’ planning
tasks (Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994; Ozonoff,
Pennington, & Rogers, 1991) insofar as all such tests
require adequate goal-monitoring.
It should be cautioned, however, that this is not an
hypothesis about ‘‘ the core cognitive impairment ’’ in the
disorder, and it is not supposed to predict all autistic
deficits without predicting ones that do not exist. Indeed
it would seem unlikely, given the complex profile of
deficits and abilities in the disorder, that such a unitary
theory will ever emerge. Rather, the hypothesis entails the
general prediction that executive and mentalising deficits
are likely to coexist in developmental disorders, and that
executive and mentalising skills are likely to have a
similar developmental trajectory within the normal popu-
lation.
Evidence for the existence of action-monitoring im-
pairments in autism is somewhat scattered. Russell (in
press) interprets work of the following kind in terms of
such an impairment : error correction within ballistic
action (Russell & Jarrold, 1998), motor planning
(Hughes, 1996), self-other discrimination in memory for
actions (Russell & Jarrold, 1999), imitation (Smith &
Bryson, 1994). However, no direct studies of action-
monitoring in autism have been carried out to date. That
is to say, in each of the cases mentioned above the deficit
reported is not in monitoring itself but is, rather,
explained in those terms post hoc.
Accordingly, our first experiment was a direct test of
action-monitoring abilities in autism. The participants’
task was to detect which of a number of stimuli moving
on a computer screen was being controlled by their own
hand movements, movements which had been occluded
from them. For example, there might be five stimuli
moving on the screen, one of which is being controlled by
hand movements he or she is currently making with a
bus-mouse inside a box. The task must be done by
watching the screen to see which of the five corresponds
most closely to the movements of one’s unseen hand. If
the participant has an action-monitoring deficit—the
assumption runs—it will be difficult to match proprio-
ceptive information with visual information.
Experiment One
Method
Participants. Eighty-four children participated in this
study, falling into one of three groups: children with autism
(CWA), children with moderate learning difficulties (MLD),
and typically developing children. There were 28 children in
each group, with participants being matched individually across
the groups on the basis of verbal mental age, as measured by the
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS-Long Form; Dunn,
Dunn, Whetton, & Pintillie, 1982). The developmental level of
the children ranged from 4 to 10 years. A one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with verbal mental age (VMA) as the
dependent variable showed that there was no difference between
the groups on this measure, F(2, 83)fl 0–02, n.s. In addition,
there was no difference between the Verbal IQs (VIQ) of the
children with autism and those with MLD, t(54)fl 0–34, n.s.
The children’s level of nonverbal ability was also assessed.
Children under the age of 5 years 3 months completed the
Picture Completion subtest of the Wechsler Preschool and
Primary Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1990). Children aged
between 5 years 3 months and 11 years 8 months completed
Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices, while children aged
11 years 9 months and above completed Raven’s Standard
Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1986). The raw
scores for nonverbal ability were transformed into Z-scores for
comparison using a one-way ANOVA, with nonverbal ability
as the dependent measure. (The Z-scores were calculated from
the present sample, not from standardised scores on the task.)
Once again, there were no significant group differences on this
measure, F(2, 83)fl 0–16, n.s. Participant details are shown in
Table 1.
The children with autism were selected if they had been
formally diagnosed as having autism or Asperger syndrome, or
on the basis of presenting with the characteristic symptoms of
the disorder. In this latter case, a questionnaire, based on a
diagnostic classification system (DSM-IV; American Psychi-
atric Association, 1994), was completed by the child’s teacher.
Of the 28 children assessed, 25 had a diagnosis of autism, one a
diagnosis of Asperger syndrome, and the remaining two were
included on the basis of their teacher’s completions of the
questionnaire. Twenty-seven children were attending special
schools or units for children with autism and Asperger
syndrome and one child was attending a mainstream school.
The children with MLD were attending schools for children
with learning difficulties in the East of England and the typically
developing children were attending local state primary schools.
Apparatus and task. Children were tested individually in a
quiet room at their school. They completed a computerised task
(the action-monitoring task), run on an Acorn ‘‘Risc ’’ PC.
In the task, a number of differently coloured dots (for
example, five) moved across the computer screen whenever the
bus-mouse was moved. One of these dots was controlled directly
by the computer mouse (the target dot). The remaining
(distractor) dots, while they began and ceased their movement
at the same time as the target’s movement, moved in different
directions to that moved by target dot. Children were required
to move these dots around (with vision of their hand on the bus-
mouse obscured) and to detect which was the target dot.
The task was presented as a series of levels graded in difficulty.
At the first level there were only two dots (one target and one
distractor). As criterion for passing each level was reached (see
below), the number of distractor dots increased by one until the
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Table 1
Participant Details for Experiment 1
Autism MLD Normal
(Nfl 28) (Nfl 28) (Nfl 28)
Males (Females) 21 (7) 9 (19) 16 (12)
CAa (yr. mth)
Mean 10–09 10–06 6–09
SD 3–04 2–47 1–52
Range 7–02–18–03 7–11–16–09 4–06–8–09
VMA (yr. mth)
Mean 6–08 6–04 6–06
SD 1–67 1–68 1–66
Range 4–02–10–06 4–04–10–04 4–00–10–04
Nonverbal abilityb
Mean fi0–001 fi0–001 fi0–142
SD 1–0 1–0 1–239
a CA: chronological age.
b Z score.
final level, at which there were seven dots on the screen—one
target dot and six distractors. Children moved up to the next
level of the task as their performance over the previous 10 trials
moved significantly above chance. If 30 trials passed without
the child performing a run of 10 trials above chance level, the
program terminated. Criterion was assessed relative to the most
recent 10 trials, such that to attain criterion with one target and
one distractor dot (level one), 9 of the 10 most recent trials must
be passed, at level two (one target, two distractors) 7 out of 10
trials must be passed, at level three (three distractors) 6 out of 10
trials must be passed, at levels four and five (four and five
distractors) 5 out of 10 trials must be passed, and finally, at level
six (six distractors) 4 out of the10 trials must be passed. Once all
levels of the task had been completed, or the criterion for
passing to the next level had not been met, a display on the
screen told the child that the game was over.
The dots were of different colours and they moved on the
screen in a continuous (not ballistic) manner as the bus-mouse
was moved. The distractor dots, in addition to beginning their
movement at a different point on the screen, moved in a
different direction to the target dot. The way in which this was
achieved varied between levels. For example, when there were
three dots on the screen, if the target dot was moved up and
down distractor dot A would move down as the target moved
up and vice versa, whereas distractor dot B would move with the
target. Then, if the target was then moved from left to right,
distractor A would move in the same way whereas distractor B
would move left when the target moved right and right when the
target moved left. In the case of circular movements, the
distractors could move in the opposite direction to the target or
in distortions of the target circles. Crucially, themore distractors
thatwere present thewider was the variety of mouse-movements
that had to be made to discriminate the target from the
distractors. (Full details of the algorithm used for the distractors
are available from the authors.)
Accuracy data for each trial were recorded by the computer
on-line. The particular movements of the computer mouse were
also recorded at intervals of 100 ms. This enabled group
differences in strategies to be examined. To date, no group
differences have emerged (details available from the first
author).
Procedure. The child was seated in front of the computer
screen, controlling the bus-mouse with his}her preferred hand.
A box was placed over a child’s hand to ensure that his}her
movements were occluded. The side of the box on which the
hand entered was curtained. At the outset, the experimenter
explained the task to the child. She then completed two trials as
a demonstration.
The initial instructions were given to the child at the same
time as the experimenter demonstrated the task. These were as
follows: ‘‘First, you will see two coloured dots on the screen.
If you move the mouse, the dots will move. But only one of
the dots moves in exactly the same way that the mouse moves.
If I move the mouse like this, the dot moves the same way—
up and down. But this other dot moves differently. You must
move the mouse and decide which dot is being moved by it. So,
you move the mouse however you like until you have decided
which dot you are moving. When you have decided, say
‘stop’ and I will ask you for your answer. Then you can have
another go. ’’
The child then began the task. His or her first trial served,
then, as an experimental trial : there were no practice runs.
Throughout the task the experimenter continued to remind the
child what had to be done.
Each trial terminated after 30 s, signified by a beep. As we
have seen, if children identified the correct dot earlier than the
30 s time limit, they indicated this verbally to the experimenter.
In such cases the trial was terminated by the experimenter
pressing the space bar on the computer. Once a trial had been
terminated the computer screen froze. At this point children
had to use the mouse to select the dot that they had chosen by
pointing the cursor at the chosen dot and clicking. Once a trial
had been completed and the child was ready, the experimenter
initiated the next trial by pressing the space bar.
As described earlier, each level of the task lasted between 10
and 30 trials, with children transferring to the next level as soon
as their performance over the preceding 10 trials was signifi-
cantly above chance. If, after 30 trials, the child had failed to
perform the previous 10 at above chance level, the program
terminated. (The children had not been told that there would be
more than one level of the game at the outset.) As the next level
of the task began the experimenter pointed out that there was
now an additional distractor dot.
The mean (SD) times to complete a session were as follows:
autism 14–00 min (7–06) ; MLD 13–61 min (9–02) ; typically
developing 16–39 min (7–43). The longest time taken to complete
the task was around 45 min, which was the case for one child per
group.
Results
We will first report the mean (SD) number of levels
passed in each group. These were as follows: autism 3–14
(2–77); MLD 3–36 (2–60); typically developing 4–57 (2–25).
A one-way ANOVA with group as the factor and number
of levels passed as the dependent variable was computed.
There was no significant difference between the groups in
the number of levels passed, F(2, 83)fl 2–56, n.s.
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Table 2
Number of Children in Each Group Passing Each Number
of Levels of the Task
Autism MLD Normal
Levels passed (Nfl 28) (Nfl 28) (Nfl 28)
None 10 6 2
One 2 5 4
Two — 1 —
Three 1 1 2
Four 2 3 1
Five — — —
Six 13 12 19
Table 3
Percentage of Blocks Passed or Not Passed for Each
Group
Autism MLD Normal
(Nfl 28) (Nfl 28) (Nfl 28)
Blocks passed
In 10 trials 40–48
a
32–14
a
56–55
b
In 11–20 trials 4–76
a
14–29
b
10–71
b
In 21–30 trials 7–74
a
8–93
a
8–33
a
No blocks passed 47–02
a
44–64
a
24–40
b
Percentages with different subscripts differ significantly by at
least p! .05 using chi-square tests.
The number of children passing each task was also
investigated (see Table 2). Separate chi-square tests com-
paring the number of children in each group who passed
each level of the task revealed that there was no significant
difference between the three groups in terms of the
number of children passing levels one to six of the task,
but that there was a significant group difference in the
number of children who failed to pass the first level of the
task, v#(2)fl 6–79, p!–05. There was, however, no differ-
ence between the number of children with autism failing
before the first level as compared against children with
MLD: the group difference was due to the low number of
typically developing children failing the first level of the
task.
The number of trials taken to pass each level of the task
was also investigated. The percentage of levels passed in
(a) the minimum (10) number of trials, (b) 11–20 trials,
and (c) 21–30 (maximum number of trials completed to
pass a level fl 30), as well as the percentage of levels not
passed, was calculated (see Table 3). Separate chi-square
analyses were calculated in order to compare the groups
on each measure. These revealed significant group differ-
ences on all measures except for that of the percentage of
levels passed in 21–30 trials : levels passed in 10 trials,
v#(2)fl 21–09, p! .001; levels passed in 11–20 trials,
v#(2)fl 8–7, p! .01; levels passed in 21–30 trials, v#(2)fl
0–16, n.s. ; levels not passed, v#(2)fl 21–88, p! .001. The
directions of these group differences are shown by
subscripts in Table 3. Inspection of the group differences
revealed that typically developing children were signifi-
cantly more likely, on the whole, to perform well.
Children with autism were significantly less likely to
pass levels in between 11 and 20 trials in comparison to
the children in both the typically developing and MLD
groups. Thus, although the three groups did not differ in
terms of overall number of levels passed, there were
group differences in terms of the number of trials taken to
pass each level, with children in the typically developing
group generally showing superior performance.
VMA and number of levels of the task passed were
correlated for each group separately. This tests revealed
that for children with MLD and for those in the typically
developing group, VMA correlated significantly with the
number of levels of the task passed , r(26)fl .45, p! .05;
r(26)fl .53, p! .01 for the MLD and typically develop-
ing groups respectively. In the case of children with
autism, this correlation fell just short of significance,
r(26)fl .36, pfl .057.
Discussion
It is clear that children with autism were no worse
overall than a matched clinical group at detecting which
of a set of moving stimuli was under the control of their
(invisibly) moving hand. The fact that the two clinical
groups performed less well, on some criteria, than did the
typically developing children is of course inconsistent
with there being a specifically autistic deficit on tasks
of this kind. Russell’s (1997a) conjecture that action-
monitoring difficulties might underpin both executive
and theory of mind deficits in autism received, therefore,
no support.
Accordingly, this study has demonstrated that children
with autism, at this level of general ability at least, do not
show a specific deficit in the monitoring of (what
philosophers call) ‘‘basic ’’ actions. These are actions in
the sense of bodily movements that are not a means for
the achievement of a further goal. Basic actions are ends
in themselves and they bear some similarity to the
Piagetian notion of ‘‘primary circular reaction’’ (Piaget,
1955). It remains possible, however, that there is a higher-
level monitoring deficit in autism of the kind that was
discussed earlier in the context of Feinberg’s (1978) and
Frith’s (1992) work on schizophrenic cognition. In this
case the monitoring is of what one might call ‘‘mental
actions’’ rather than basic actions. Consider the case of a
ballistic, goal-directed action such as aiming a dart at a
dartboard. The high-level intention might be to put the
dart in double 14, while holding and throwing the dart in
a certain way is intended to bring about that goal. What
is crucial here is the fact that failing to achieve the goal
(missing the target in this case) does not cause a
reconstrual of the nature of the intention—which was a
mental event (a ‘‘ trying’’), not a bodily action. The
possibility exists, therefore, that whereas basic actions
may indeed receive adequate monitoring, mental actions
of this ballistic and goal-directed kind may not.
It might be claimed, then, that children with autism
have an inadequate experience of trying to achieve a goal.
This could reasonably be extended towards the claim that
children with autism will be likely to confuse intended
with desired (but not intended) outcomes (Experiment 2)
and intended with unintended and also unexpected
outcomes (Experiment 3). At this point, however, the
predictions made by this version of the executive-deficit
theory become indistinguishable from those of the ToM-
deficit theory (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1987). For to
say that the core cognitive deficit in autism is one of
theory of mind is to say that there exists a weak grasp of
intention as a concept—as opposed to having an impover-
ished experience of intending (the executive-deficit claim).
Our second experiment was an attempt to replicate and
extend a study by Phillips et al. (1998), which had
321INTENTION UNDERSTANDING IN AUTISM
appeared to demonstrate an autism-specific deficit in
reporting what was intended when the unintended out-
come was one that was desired. Children with autism and
with MLD played a target-shooting game in which they
tried to win prizes by shooting ‘‘cans’’ off a ‘‘wall ’’ by
firing a ‘‘gun’’. These cans either contained a prize or
they did not; but the children did not know whether the
can at which they were aiming did or did not contain a
prize. The cans were of different colours. On the crucial
trials, the child aimed at (say) a red can but happened to
knock down the adjacent blue can, which—it turned
out—contained a prize. In order to report correctly that
the can at which they had aimed was the red can, it was
necessary for the children to discriminate the outcome
that they desired (win a prize) from the outcome that they
had intended (hit red). We know that children of around
5 years of age have difficulty distinguishing the intention
that generated an action from its outcome (Astington,
1990; Lee, 1995; Phillips, 1993).
In the original study by Phillips et al. the children
played the target-shooting game themselves. In our study
this was also the case, but we added a third-person
condition in which the children watched a video of
somebody else playing the game and reported her
intentions. The additional condition was included for the
following reason. If, as the executive theory suggests, it is
the first-person experience of intending that is impover-
ished in autism then one would expect first-person
performance to be worse than third-person performance
in the children with autism, because in the latter case they
merely have to report what the person on the video said
she was aiming for. If, on the other hand, the difficulty
with intention reporting involves the lack of a conceptual
insight then we would expect first- and third-person
performance to be at a similar level.
Experiment Two
Method
Participants. One hundred and twelve children participated
in the study, falling into three groups: children and adolescents
Table 4
Participant Details for Experiment 2
Autism AS Normal
(Nfl 32) (Nfl 24) (Nfl 56)
CAa
Mean 9–09 10–06 5–03
SD 2–10 3–04 0–08
Range 5–10–17–02 4–07–17–08 4–06–6–11
BPVSa (Age equiv.)
Mean 6–04
a
9–03
b
5–07
a
SD 2–02 3–04 1–04
Range 4–02–12–02 4–06–16–04 4.00–8–11
VIQa
Mean 67–98
a
89–52
b
108–07
c
SD 21–96 22–43 25–20
Range 29–39–118–04 51–84–140–56 67–37–195–37
TROGa (Age equiv.)
Mean 6–04
a
7–05
b
6–02
a
SD 2–02 2–04 2–01
Rangeb 4–11 4–04–11 4–03–11
a All given as year. month.
b An age equivalent score of 11 years is ceiling on this test.
Means with different subscripts differ significantly by at least p! .001 by the Fisher Least
Significant Difference Test.
with autism (CWA), children and adolescents with Asperger
syndrome (AS), and typically developing children. The children
with autism and those with AS were placed in separate groups
and compared to typically developing children with VMA levels
between 4 and 6 years. Thirteen of the children with autism had
served as participants in Experiment 1.
All children completed the BPVS (Long Form) and the Test
for the Reception of Grammar (TROG; Bishop, 1989). Par-
ticipant details are shown in Table 4. The CWA group and the
typically-developing controls performed at a similar age level
on both the BPVS and TROG, while the children in the AS
group performed at a significantly higher level than those in the
other two groups (see Table 4). In terms of VIQ, each group
differed significantly from the others, F(2, 373)fl 92–76, p!
.001, with the ability ordering being (from lowest to highest) :
CWA, AS, typically developing.
Participants were assigned to the clinical groups using the
same criteria as those described in Experiment 1. In all cases,
only children who obtained an age-equivalent score of 4 years
or above on both BPVS and TROG, in addition to having
English as their first language, were included in the study.
Apparatus. The shooting game was placed on a table top in
front of the child. It measured 50 cm wide by 90 cm long by
40 cm high and consisted of six coloured targets (canisters)
which were balanced on a cardboard ‘‘wall ’’. Opposite the wall,
and at a distance of 60 cm, was a plastic water-pistol mounted
on a pivot. The water-pistol had been modified electronically to
ensure that pulling the gun’s trigger closed a switch, which in
turn made a canister fall from the wall. A toggle of switches
enabled the experimenter to select which of the six canisters
would fall when the gun was fired. (The box of switches was out
of the child’s view behind the cardboard wall.) Thus, the child
determined when a can fell but not which can fell. The prizes
(Smarties) were placed in 50% of the canisters. Children were
given a memory aid, with six coloured pieces of card acting as
visual reminders of the intended target.
Design and task. Children completed one of two versions of
the task, playing the target game themselves (first-person
version) or watching a video of another person (female) playing
the game (third-person version).
In the first-person condition the procedure was essentially the
same as that used by Phillips et al. Children were told that the
idea was to see how many prizes they could win by shooting
down the cans, some of which had prizes hidden inside. They
knew that only some of the cans contained a prize. According to
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Table 5
Mean (SD) Scores for Each Group in Each Condition (max scorefl 4) for the Target-shooting Task
First-person (game) Third-person (video)
Autism
(Nfl 17)
AS
(Nfl 10)
Typical
(Nfl 27)
Autism
(Nfl 15)
AS
(Nfl 14)
Typical
(Nfl 29)
Hit-prize 4–0 3–7 3–8 3–9 4–0 4–0
(0) (1–0) (0–8) (0–5) (0–3) (0)
Hit-no prize 3–4 3–5 3–4 3–2 3–1 3–0
(1–1) (1–3) (0–9) (1–1) (1–6) (1–07)
Miss-prize 3–0 4–0 3–3 3–3 3–1 3–4
(1–6) (0) (1–2) (1–1) (1–6) (1–2)
Miss-no prize 3–1 4–0 3–7 3–5 3–4 3–3
(1–6) (0) (1–1) (1–1) (1–2) (1–3)
Phillips et al., this methodology ensures that there is a desire (to
win a prize), an intention (to shoot a specific can), and an action
on the part of each child for each trial. The outcome of the
intention would be either a ‘‘hit ’’ or a ‘‘miss ’’, with a miss being
when the can at which the child had not aimed fell down.
The child only won a prize, then, on certain trials. This led to
four possible outcomes—‘‘hit-prize ’’, ‘‘hit-no prize ’’, ‘‘miss-
prize ’’, ‘‘miss-no prize ’’. Thus, in the hit-prize condition, for
example, the correct can fell down and was found to contain a
prize ; in the miss-no prize condition, an incorrect can fell down
and did not contain a prize. Two of these four outcomes can be
described as consistent (hit-prize, miss-no prize), and two as
discrepant (hit-no prize, miss-prize).
For the third-person condition, a videotape had been made of
a girl playing the game, with the camera positioned behind her
head. Children watched this video and answered the same test
questions as the children who played the game themselves.
Procedure. For both the first- and third-person versions of
the task, children were tested individually in a single session
lasting no more than 10 minutes. Within each participant group,
children were allocated randomly to either the first- or the third-
person condition.
Sixteen experimental trials were completed. Because only six
canisters were visible at any one time, two further sets of
canisters were hidden behind the wall and were used to replace
the previous six canisters after trials 6 and 12.
(1) First-person condition. Children were given the following
instructions. ‘‘ In this game you have to shoot the little cans off
the wall to win some prizes. But only some of the cans have got
a prize in. Some of them are empty. Let’s see how many prizes
you can win. When we start the game, I’ll tell you a colour and
then you point the gun at it. When I say ‘shoot’, then you can
pull the trigger. If you hit the can, it will fall down, and we can
see if you’ve won a prize. Okay? Let’s put this card here to
remind you which one to shoot’’ (The experimenter places the
appropriately coloured card by the gun, in front of the child).
‘‘This is the colour you are going to shoot at. Ready … Shoot! ’’
(A can falls down and the child opens the lid.) When the
outcome has been revealed, the child is asked the test question:
‘‘Which colour did you mean to shoot? The [say] red one or the
[say] green one? ’’ After the child had answered, the game started
again until 16 experimental trials had been completed.
(2) Third-person condition. In this condition all children were
eventually allowed to play the game themselves, although no
data were collected from this. Before they played they were
invited to watch a videotape of somebody else playing the game.
The additional instructions in this case were as follows: ‘‘You
can play the game in a little while, but first I want to show you
a film of somebody else playing it and ask you some questions.
Let’s watch the video and see how many prizes Jacqui wins.
When she starts she chooses a colour. Look she is going to try
and hit the red can. ’’ (The participant sees Jacqui aim at a can,
shoot, and the can fall down. Jacqui then opens the can to reveal
to the participant whether or not she has won a prize.) ‘‘Oh
look, Jacqui won a prize ! ’’ (Or ‘‘ … Jacqui didn’t win a prize
that time. ’’) At this point the child is asked a test question about
Jacqui’s performance: ‘‘Which colour did Jacqui mean to shoot?
The [say] red one or the [say] green one? ’’ A further 15 trials then
followed.
Scoring. For both conditions, one point was awarded for
each trial in which the child identified correctly the intended
colour. This resulted in a maximum score of 4 per condition:
hit-prize, hit-no prize, miss-prize, miss-no prize.
Results
The mean scores for each group and condition are
given for the first- (game) and third-person (video) tasks
separately (see Table 5).
In order to facilitate comparison with the data of
Phillips et al. we will first report the data in a similar way
to that in which these authors reported them. Within each
task, a repeated measures ANOVA with one between-
subjects factor (group) and one within-subjects factor
(reward—prize}no prize) was applied to the data for the
hit and miss conditions separately. The data were also
initially analysed separately for the first- and third-person
tasks.
First-person ‘‘hit ’’ conditions. In the two hit con-
ditions (i.e., the intended can fell down and either did or
did not contain a reward), the repeated measures
ANOVA revealed no significant effect of group,
F(2, 53)fl 0–02, n.s., but a significant effect of prize,
F(1, 53)fl 10–77, p! .01, reflecting more accurate per-
formance on those trials where the can contained a prize
than when it did not. There was no significant group x
prize interaction, F(2, 53)fl 1–44, n.s.
First-person ‘‘miss ’’ conditions. There were no signi-
ficant effects in the two miss conditions (the intended can
did not fall down and the can that was accidentally hit
either contained a reward or it did not). The ANOVA
outcome was as follows: group, F(2, 51)fl 2–09, n.s. ;
prize, F(1, 51)fl 1–76, n.s. ; group‹prize, F(2, 51)fl
1–41, n.s. Despite the lack of an interaction between
group and prize, an a priori t-test was carried out to ask
whether the performance of the children with autism was
worse than that of the typically developing children in the
condition in which a prize was inadvertently won.
According to Phillips et al. this is the condition on which
an autistic deficit should show up. This analysis had a
nonsignificant outcome, t(42)flfi0–66, n.s.
Third-person ‘‘ hit ’’ conditions. The results mirrored
those of the hit conditions in the first-person version of
the task. There was no significant effect of group,
F(2, 55)fl 0–98, n.s. and a significant effect of prize,
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F(1, 55)fl 26–01, p! .001, reflecting more accurate per-
formance on those trials where the can contained a prize
than when it did not. No significant group‹prize
interaction emerged, F (2, 55)fl 0–64, n.s.
Third-person ‘‘Miss ’’ conditions. In line with per-
formance on the miss conditions in the first-person
version of the task, there were no significant effects of
either group, prize or their interaction, group, F(2, 55)fl
0–04, n.s. ; prize, F(1, 55)fl 1.44, n.s. ; group‹prize,
F(2, 55)fl 1–29, n.s. For the reasons given above, we also
carried out an a priori t-test to compare performance
between the autistic and typically developing groups
within the condition on which a prize was inadvertently
won. This was also nonsignificant, t(42)flfi0–39, n.s.
In order to compare performance across the two
versions of the task (first-person vs. third-person) the
data were combined into a single ANOVA with two
between-subjects factors (group, task) and two within-
subjects factors (outcome, hit}miss ; reward, prize}no
prize). This analysis revealed no significant effect of
group, F(2, 106)fl 1–03, n.s., of task, F(1, 106)fl 1–82,
n.s., or of outcome, F(1, 106)fl 1–5, n.s. Indeed, only
three comparisons were significant. First, there was a
significant effect of prize, F(1, 106)fl 18–94, p!–001,
indicating that children were significantly more likely to
respond accurately when a can contained a prize than
when it did not. Second, therewas a significant interaction
between outcome and reward, F(1, 106)fl 24–73, p!
.001, indicating that while the children were more
successful in the hit condition when a prize was won; this
was not the case when it was a miss. As was to be
expected, the least successful condition was the miss-prize
condition. Finally, the group‹task‹reward interaction
was significant, F(2, 106)fl 3–97, p! .05. This significant
interaction seems to have been due to the fact that only in
the typically developing children was there a substantially
larger deficit in the no prize condition in the third-person
than in the first-person version of the task.
Discussion
This study failed to replicate the results obtained, with
a very similar procedure, by Phillips et al. (1998). We
failed to find an autism-specific deficit in reporting an
intention when the outcome was fortuitously good (the
miss-prize condition). We also report that individuals
with Asperger with VMAs around 9 years performed at a
similar level to the other two groups (see Table 5b). We
now consider differences between our study and the
Phillips et al. study in an attempt to explain this failure of
replication.
The most obvious difference between our study and
that of Phillips et al. was that while our main comparison
had been between children with autism and VMA-
matched typically developing children, their comparison
was between children with autism and children with
MLD. The reason we did not include an MLD group in
this study was that such a comparison would be unin-
formative if the autistic group turned out to perform as
well as typically developing children—which it did.
Another difference between our participant children
and those of Phillips et al. resided in the differences
between the mean chronological ages of the two groups
of children with autism. While the VMAs of the two
groupswere very similar (just over 6 years onTROG—the
test used by Phillips et al.), the mean chronological age of
the Phillips et al. children with autism was 13–39 years
whereas that of our children with autism was around
9 years (see Table 4). Consequently, the VIQs of their
children were lower than those of our children. But set
against this is the fact that, despite our group of children
with autism having lower IQs than the typically develop-
ing children, t(54)flfi5–5, p!–001, they performed at a
similar level to these comparison children. Given this, it is
surely difficult to maintain that there is an autistic
‘‘deficit ’’ on the task.
The appropriate conclusion would appear to be,
therefore, that individuals with autism do not show a
deficit in reporting on failed intentions that have fortuit-
ously good outcomes. This result is one that is in-
consistent both with Russell’s (1997a) version of the
executive-deficit theory of autism and with the ToM-
deficit theory. The fact that performance in all groups
was similar across first- and third-person conditions
further counterindicates Russell’s account, given that this
account assumes that awareness of one’s own intentions
is more ‘‘direct ’’ than the awareness of those of other
people.
Our final experiment was concerned with unsuccessful,
intended actions that were not ballistic. These are actions
that, at the time of being undertaken, appear to be
successful, but which unexpectedly turn out not to have
been successful. Perhaps an autism-specific deficit would
be found if the children were asked what they had
‘‘meant’’ to do or what they ‘‘ thought ’’ they were doing
in such a case.
A task was devised in order to ask this question—the
‘‘ transparent intentions task’’. In this task, children are
presented with a transparency of the kind used with
overhead projectors on which there is an unfinished
drawing—such as a boy’s head missing one ear. The child
is given a pen and invited to finish the drawing. When this
is done, it is revealed that in fact he or she had been
drawing on the uppermost of two overlaid transparencies.
The outcome is that, while the face appears to have been
completed, when the top transparency is removed it can
be seen that the lines drawn by the child have really
completed the drawing of a cup on the top transparency,
with the ‘‘ ear ’’ outline now representing a handle (see
Fig. 1). The child is then asked whether he or she meant to
draw ‘‘an ear ’’ or ‘‘a cup-handle ’’ or whether she thought
she was drawing ‘‘an ear ’’ or ‘‘a cup-handle ’’. In this
task, therefore, the child is in control of the action from
start to finish, but the action turns out to be unsuccessful
nonetheless. All stimuli for the transparent intentions
task are shown in Fig. 1.
In an earlier, unpublished study in which typically
developing preschool children completed the transparent
intentions task we found that a group of 4-year-old
children was better than chance when they were asked
what they had meant to draw, whereas a group of 3-year-
olds was not. However, when children were asked what
they thought they had been drawing, the data were less
clear-cut (Russell, Hill, & Franco, 2000).
In our final study we compared the performance of
children with autism against that of children with MLD
on the transparent intentions task and did so under both
first- and third-person conditions. In the first-person
condition the child him}herself completed the drawing,
while in the third-person case the child watched a glove-
puppet doing so. In addition to this, and in order to
investigate whether intention-reporting makes similar
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(a)
Time1: Initial view
(b)
Time2: Content of top transparency
Draw ear
Handle
(c) (d)
Draw smoke
(chimney)
Smoke (boat)
(e) (f)
Draw top of
tree
Ice-cream
(g) (h)
Draw face
(girl)
Draw face
(boy)
Figure 1. Stimuli used in the transparent intentions task. The right-hand picture sat on top of the left-hand picture and was not visible
to the child when it was being drawn on.
cognitive demands to ToM tasks, we presented the
children with a set of ToM tasks. They received first- and
third-person false-belief tasks (based on Wimmer &
Perner, 1983, and Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987,
respectively). Additionally, children completed a task
devised by Joseph (1998) that tapped their understanding
of pretence through asking whether children appreciate
that only a person pretending to be asleep can be said to
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be ‘‘ trying’’ to snore. (This can of course, be regarded as
a further test of the understanding of intentional action.)
Finally, we attempted to cover the possibility that any
group differences which emerged might be due to the fact
that childrenwith autism are more likely than comparison
children to show what is called ‘‘ intellectual realism’’,
i.e., drawing what is known to be there rather than what
is in the visual field. While Charman and Baron-Cohen
(1993) have suggested that children with autism do not
show such a tendency, we felt that we should cover this
possibility. We presented the children with a task devised
by Beal and Arnold (1990) that assessed intellectual
realism in drawing.
Experiment Three
Method
Participants. Two groups of children participated in this
study: children with autism (CWA) and children with moderate
learning difficulties (MLD). There were 27 children in each
group, with children being selected and matched individually
across the two groups as described in the first study. Some of the
children had participated in either one or both of the studies
reported above. There were no differences in VMA or VIQ
between the two groups: VMA, t(86)fl 0.69, n.s. ; VIQ, t(86)fl
0.68, n.s. Participant details are shown in Table 6.
Design. Each child completed five tasks : the transparent
intentions task (first- and third-person conditions) ; two false-
belief tasks (first- and third-person conditions) ; Joseph’s (1998)
intention-by-pretend task; and Beal and Arnold’s (1990) test of
intellectual realism in drawing.
Tasks.
(1) Transparent intentions task. In each trial, two sheets of
transparent acetate (A and B) were employed, each showing a
different drawing. When A was placed on top of B only the
bottom picture (B) was visible because of the drawings having
been aligned, and because drawing A formed a part of B. For
example, one trial consisted of a picture of a choirboy with an
ear missing (B) and a teacup with its handle missing (A). When
combined, the picture was a choirboy with an ear missing. Three
other combinations were used: house (B) and ship (A), tree (B)
and ice-cream (A), a girl (B) and a boy (A). The combinations
of pictures are shown in Fig. 1.
In the first-person condition of the task, each child was shown
initially what appeared to be a single transparency containing a
drawing and asked what the drawing showed and what was
missing from it. He or she then drew in the missing part of the
picture, after which point the transparencies were separated
from one another, revealing the uppermost picture on which,
unbeknown to the child, he or she had drawn. Once the two
pictures had been described, the child was asked two questions :
‘‘Remember when you did the drawing, did you think you were
drawing an X or a Y?’’ (Think question) ; ‘‘Remember when
you did the drawing, did you mean to draw an X or an Y?’’
Table 6
Participant Details for Experiment 3
Autism
(Nfl 27)
MLD
(Nfl 27)
CA (yr. mth)
Mean 11–04 11–00
SD 3–06 2–08
Range 7–02–18–03 7–07–17–01
VMA (yr. mth)
Mean 6–02 6–01
SD 1–09 1–10
Range 4–02–11–02 4–04–11–02
(Mean question). The order of presentation of the ‘‘ think’’ and
‘‘mean’’ questions was counterbalanced across the children, as
was the order of referring to the pictures in the questions.
In the third-person condition of each version of the task,
children watched a glove-puppet complete the task as described
above. The experimenter gave a running commentary on what
the puppet was doing. The children were then asked the same
questions as those described above, though with reference to the
puppet.
Each picture was used an equal number of times under the
first- and third-person conditions. Two pictures were completed
by each child, one under the first-person condition and one
under the third-person condition. The order of presentation of
these two conditions was counterbalanced across the children.
(2) False-belief tasks. Children were presented with two false-
belief tasks, one first-person and the other third-person. The
first-person version was the ‘‘unexpected contents ’’ task of
Perner et al. (1987), in which the child has to report his or her
original belief about the contents of a Smarties tube when this
turned out to be other than that expected. The third-person
false-belief task was the ‘‘unexpected-transfer ’’ task of Wimmer
and Perner (1983). The protocols are given in the Appendix. If
children failed the control questions then they were considered
to have failed that task, even if they had answered the false-
belief question correctly.
(3) Intention-by-pretend task. In this task, after Joseph (1998),
children were shown two dolls (Barbie and Action Man) and
were asked to identify them. The experimenter then told stories
about the (say) male doll, which included the information that
he was pretending to be asleep and pretending to snore and
about the female doll who was really asleep and snoring for real.
The child was then asked two control questions : ‘‘Who is just
pretending to snore? ’’ and ‘‘Who is really snoring?’’ If these
were failed, the child heard the story again and the control
questions were repeated. Then the child was asked the test
question: ‘‘Who is trying to snore? ’’
(4) Intellectual realism. In this task, modelled on that of Beal
and Arnold (1990), children were shown a mug (without
decoration) and asked to identify it. The mug was then placed
on the table in front of the child, with the handle facing away
from the child, hidden from view. The experimenter then told
the child, ‘‘ I would like you to draw exactly what you can see
from where you are sitting’’. The drawings were then rated for
the presence}absence of a handle by three independent judges,
who were naı$ve to the purpose of the experiment. Where the
judges disagreed, the majority verdict was adopted.
General procedure. Children were tested individually in a
quiet room at their school. They were assigned randomly to one
of eight conditions in which the order of tasks was counter-
balanced under certain constraints. These were that neither the
two transparent intentions tasks nor the two false-belief tasks
should be presented consecutively, and that the intellectual
realism task should never precede the boy}cup condition of the
transparent intentions task. Each testing session lasted approxi-
mately 10–15 minutes.
Results and Discussion
The percentages of children in each group passing each
task are shown in Table 7. Chi-square analyses were
carried out in order to compare performance on each task
across groups. It can be seen that the only task on which
there was a difference in performance between the two
groups was the third-person version of the false-belief
task. Here, as expected, the children with MLD outper-
formed those with autism.
In addition, we analysed performance on the first
question that had been asked only. These data are also
shown in Table 7. Chi-squared analyses revealed that
there was a significant difference between the groups in
terms of accuracy of responding to the first-person
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Table 7
Percentage of Children in Each Group Passing Each Task in Experiment 3 and for First
Presentation of Transparent Intentions Task Questions Only
Each task in Experiment 3
First presentation of
question only (TI)
Autism
(Nfl 27)
MLD
(Nfl 27) v#
Autism
(Nfl 27)
MLD
(Nfl 27)
TI, first-person think question 63–0 74–1 0–8 64–3 71–4
TI, first-person mean question 55–6 63–0 0–3 53–9 69–2
TI, third-person think question 63–0 59–3 0–1 61–6 69–2
TI, third-person mean question 70–4 70–4 0–0 57–1 64–3
False belief, first-person 61–5 61–5 0–0 — —
False belief, third-person 51–9 77–8 4–0* — —
Intention-by-pretend 74–1 88–9 2–0 — —
Intellectual realism 33–3 40–7 0–3 — —
TI: transparent intentions task.
*p!–05; all other results n.s.
condition of the transparent intentions task when the
mean question was the first question asked, v#(1)fl 4–99,
p! .05, reflecting superior responding in the children
with MLD.
In conclusion, the only task on which there was found
to be an unqualified group difference was the unexpected
transfer task (third-person false belief), on which autistic
deficits are thoroughly documented (e.g., Baron-Cohen,
Leslie, & Frith, 1985). However, despite the group
differences, our children with autism performed better
than one would have expected them to perform at this
intellectual level (Yirmiya, Erel, Shaed, & Solomonika-
Levi, 1998). Moreover, in light of their well-documented
difficulties with the first-person false-belief task (e.g.,
Perner et al., 1987) it is surprising that the children with
autism did not underperform on this task in our study. In
the case of both false-belief tasks it is very likely that the
relatively good performance of the children with autism
was due to the fact that such children in the U.K. have
been over-researched on these measures. This fact high-
lights the importance of devising novel mental-concept
tasks for research on autistic cognition.
On the intention-by-pretend task, which also tapped
the understanding of intention, there were again no group
differences. The conclusion that the children with autism
performed no worse than the children with MLD on the
transparent intentions task has to be qualified by saying
that there was a group difference, in favour of the MLD
children, when three conditions were met : it was the first-
person task; the mean question was asked; and this
question was asked first.
General Discussion
Our first study demonstrated that the performance of
children with autism is normal on an action-monitoring
task in which participants must select which stimulus
within a set of moving stimuli is under their control. Our
second study demonstrated that the ability of children
with autism to discriminate between intended and ac-
cidental (but desired) outcomes is also normal. In our
third study, using the transparent intentions task, chil-
dren with autism were broadly successful at reporting
what they had meant to do and had thought they were
doing when the eventual outcome was unexpected and
unintended. While there was a weak trend in the
transparent intentions task for the children with autism
to perform at a lower level than children with MLD
(three conditions had to be met), there was certainly
nothing in these data to justify the term ‘‘autistic deficit ’’.
However, it would certainly be unwise to conclude
from these data that the experience and conceptualisation
of intention are essentially normal in autism. For al-
though we used a variety of tasks, we only tested children
within a narrow developmental range and with chrono-
logical ages into late childhood. So the possibility remains
that had more challenging tasks been used or had the
same tasks been given to younger children autistic deficts
might have been revealed. Such a possibility cannot be
discounted. That said, our aim is not to report an entirely
‘‘ intact ’’ ability but rather to point up a contrast between
autistic performance on ‘‘ frontal ’’ and ‘‘mentalising’’
tasks and on tasks of intention monitoring and concep-
tualisation. Despite the caveats which a study of this kind
inspires, that contrast is clearly present—and it is one that
is not predicted by two cognitive theories of autism.
We will first consider how these data impact upon the
view that the core cognitive impairment in autism is in
‘‘ theory of mind’’. Towards this end, it is necessary to
distinguish between two versions of the ToM-deficit
hypothesis. The first, which we will call the ‘‘represen-
tational-deficit ’’ view, is owing to Leslie (1987), while the
second, which we will call the ‘‘mindreading-deficit ’’
view, is owing to Baron-Cohen (1995). The two views
differ over the specificity of the proposed mentalising
impairment. On the representational-deficit view, the
difficulty experienced by children with autism in under-
standing mental categories is specific to representational
mental states—such as belief. These are the mental states
whose contents represent reality as being a certain way.
Belief is the clearest example of such a mental state, in the
sense that a believer always believes that something is the
case: a belief expresses commitment to the truth of a
proposition. Intentions do not, by contrast, have prop-
ositional contents (so intentions cannot be false). Ac-
cordingly the representational-deficit theory is not clearly
committed to the claim that children with autism will find
intentions difficult to understand. The fact that the only
kind of task on which the children with autism showed a
clear deficit was the false-belief task (see Experiment 3) is
consistent with this view. (Note, however, that this fact is
also consistent with the claim that the false-belief tasks
challenge children with autism by virtue of their executive
demands: Russell, Saltmarsh, & Hill, 1999.)
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Turning to the mindblindness version of the ToM-
deficit hypothesis, what characterises this is the assump-
tion that all forms of mentalising are impaired within the
disorder, whether or not they have a representational
character (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Baron-Cohen, Wheel-
wright, & Jolliffe, 1997). The results of our second two
experiments counterindicate this position: the ability of
children with autism to report on what they and another
person intended when the intention conflicted with an
accidental but desired outcome and with an unintended
and unexpected outcome was found to be broadly
adequate.
We turn finally to the implications these data have for
the executive view of the core cognitive impairments in
autism. The finding that action-monitoring and the
reporting of one’s own intentions seem both to be
adequate in autism is evidence against Russell’s (1997a)
hypothesis that deficits in this area result in deviant
development of self awareness (and thus of theory of
mind). However, this negative result throws into relief the
forms of executive dysfunction that are consistently
found in the disorder : set-shifting and planning deficits.
Ozonoff and Jensen (1999) have recently argued that
these are the executive deficits specific to autism. Indeed
it can be argued that ‘‘ tower’’ planning tasks themselves
require a species of set-shifting by virtue of the fact that
arbitrary detours have to be made away from the direct
route to the goal position (Bı!ro! & Russell, 2001). This
would, then, make set-shifting the core executive im-
pairment in autism. Might set-shifting difficulties impact
upon the development of theory of mind? They might,
but perhaps it will prove more fruitful to develop an
homologous rather than a causal view of the executive-
ToM relationship (Russell, in press). Such a theory would
begin with the assumption that cognition is a form of set-
shifting—shifting between domains (see Fodor, 1983, on
the ‘‘central systems’’). Accordingly, children whose first-
person experience of thinking is thus impoverished would
be expected to find reflection on mental acts (their own
and those of other people) difficult to achieve.
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Appendix
Experiment 3: First-person False-belief Task
Children are shown a large tube of Smarties and are asked the
following question:
‘‘What is in here? ’’
The experimenter opens the lid of the tube and shows the
child a pencil that is inside. The pencil is put back in the tube
and the lid replaced. Children are then asked the following
belief question:
Belief question : ‘‘Before I opened the lid of the box, what did
you think was in the box?’’
Experiment 3: Third-person False-belief Task
Children are shown two empty boxes, one red and one silver.
Freddie enters and the experimenter says, ‘‘Here comes Freddie.
Freddie’s been working in a shop all day and has earned this
money. Look, one pound! Freddie is going to put his money
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away in the red box [Freddie opens the red box, places his
money inside and closes the lid]. Now Freddie’s going out to
play. He will come back for his money later [Freddie is put in the
experimenter’s bag]. Let’s play a trick on Freddie. Let’s move
his money to the silver box [The experimenter takes the coin out
of the red box, puts it in the silver box and closes both boxes].
Freddie is coming back now and wants to find his money. ’’
As Freddie is returning, the following three control questions
are asked:
Initial state question : ‘‘Where did Freddie put his money at
the start? ’’
Current state question : ‘‘Where is the money now?’’
Knowledge state question : ‘‘Does Freddie know that we’ve
moved his money?’’
Children were then asked the belief question:
Belief question : ‘‘Where does Freddie think his money is
now?’’
